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THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND DIGITAL 
PHONORECORDS 
This iBrief follows various phonorecord formats to illustrate the specifics of the First Sale 
doctrine as it applies to digital phonorecords. The author argues that the disposal of a 
digital phonorecord by means of distribution infringes an author’s exclusive right to 
reproduce the underlying musical work and this distribution is not subject to First Sale 
protection. 
Introduction 
¶ 1           Digital phonorecords are a relatively new technology that allows musical works to be played, 
recorded and stored in digital format for use on computers or other devices. This technology has amazing 
potential for consumers and musicians alike, but this potential is limited by its legal consequences.  
¶ 2           The owner of a particular copy of a traditional format phonorecord, such as a vinyl record or 
cassette tape, may dispose of her phonorecords through distribution to another person without 
interference from the Copyright owner of the musical work after the Copyright owner first makes the 
phonorecord available to the public. This protection, called "First Sale," does not shield similar disposals 
of digital phonorecords, however, because of the necessary reproductions needed to perform the task in 
the digital realm. These reproductions, when combined with the ease of distribution of illegally reproduced 
digital phonorecords, infringe rights not shielded by First Sale. 
What is a Phonorecord? 
¶ 3           Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines a phonorecord as a 
"[M]aterial object[ ] in which sounds * * * are fixed * * * and from which the sounds can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device."1  
¶ 4           This definition, like any other statutory language, is terribly clunky. In plain English, a 
phonorecord is what most people would refer to as a "record." This can be a vinyl record, a Compact Disk 
(CD), a tape, or any other fixed medium containing a song - the exact medium is not important for status 
as a phonorecord.  
¶ 5           Although the medium is not important for status as a phonorecord, fixation in a material object is 
important. The Section 101 definition indicates that a song embodied in a non-material form is not a 
phonorecord. Thus, a tune sung in the shower is not fixed in any material object and cannot therefore fit 
the definition of a phonorecord. 
The First Sale Doctrine 
¶ 6           Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act grants the owner of a Copyright six exclusive rights: 
reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, public performance, public display, and digital 
transmission performance.2 However, a Copyright owner’s right of distribution is limited by the First Sale 
Doctrine, as codified in Section 109 of the Act. Section 109(a) provides in relevant part: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of 106(3), the owner of a particular * * * phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without 
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the authority of the Copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that 
* * * phonorecord."3 
¶ 7           The disposal §109(a) speaks of allows two options: distribution of a particular phonorecord to 
another or to destruction of a particular phonorecord. Thus, this section allows me to sell a vinyl copy of a 
phonorecord to a friend or destroy my phonorecord without requiring permission from the author. First 
Sale is not an absolute right, however. It is important to note that First Sale covers transfers of 
ownership4 not merely transfers of possession, such as rental, lease or lending5 of phonorecords.6  
¶ 8           First Sale is further limited in that it applies only to "a particular * * * phonorecord lawfully made 
under this title." There are actually two important limitations in this phrase: "particular" and "lawfully 
made." First Sale allows you to dispose of only the particular copy you own. Thus, First Sale does not 
allow me to sell a friend’s phonorecord simply because I also own a copy.7 Additionally, any copy that is 
sold must be "lawfully made." This means that First Sale will not exonerate me if I sold a pirated 
phonorecord, even though I own a lawfully obtained phonorecord as well. First Sale will also not 
immunize me if I sold pirate phonorecords I had reproduced from a lawfully obtained copy because each 
and every reproduction is not the "particular" and "lawfully obtained" copy I was sold.  
¶ 9           The final limitation to the First Sale Doctrine that concerns our discussion relates to the exclusive 
rights of a Copyright owner other than those shielded by First Sale. First Sale allows you "to sell or 
otherwise dispose of" a particular phonorecord without the authorization of the Copyright owner, but it 
does not impact any of the other exclusive rights the Copyright owner holds, such as reproducing the 
work in phonorecords8 adapting the work into other formats9 or publicly performing the work10. 
Digital Phonorecords 
¶ 10           Digital phonorecords are a new concept both to Copyright law and overall society, but there 
really is no exact definition of what they are. Fortunately, the 1976 Copyright Act was written broadly to 
encompass not only 1976 technology, but also all technology "later developed." A working definition of 
"digital phonorecord" for this iBrief will be "a non-analog phonorecord fixed in a binary or digital medium." 
The most obvious example of a digital phonorecord is the now ubiquitous Mp3 file format, made famous 
by the MyMp311 and Napster cases12 but digital phonorecords can be any number of file formats.13  
¶ 11           Because these digital files are phonorecords, they must be "fixed" in "material objects," like 
other phonorecords. Section 101 defines "fixed" as:  
"[S]ufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of time of more than transitory duration."14 
¶ 12           Fixation may seem like a hurdle considering an Mp3 file is composed of ones and zeros, but 
this hurdle is quickly crossed. Unlike a shower rendition of a song that is captured only by my ears, a 
digital file is actually a series of positively- and negatively-charged ions trapped in a magnetic source, be 
it a floppy diskette or a hard disk drive. The file is thus fixed in a material object, as it will exist for as long 
as the storage medium exists (absent accidental erasure by another magnetic source). 
¶ 13           But the analysis of fixation does not end there. Much like other phonorecords, a digital 
phonorecord requires a device to allow a user to hear the sounds embodied therein. This device is 
usually a computer, but can be a digital player, such as the Rio Mp3 Player.15 The question of how the 
device, namely a computer16 plays the phonorecord is important to analyze.  
¶ 14           If the digital phonorecord is stored in magnetic media, such as a diskette, outside of the 
computer, the user must insert this media into the computer. At this point, the user has two options: copy 
the digital phonorecord onto the computer’s hard drive or play the digital phonorecord from the diskette. If 
2001 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0018 
3 
the digital phonorecord is placed onto the user’s hard drive (i.e. digitally copied), a reproduction has been 
made.17   
¶ 15           Once the decision concerning location is made, the user must then utilize a program to listen to 
the digital phonorecord. To do this, the device must load the phonorecord into Random Access Memory 
(RAM)18 regardless of whether the phonorecord is on the diskette or on the hard drive. RAM is a volatile 
memory type, not a permanent memory type, and thus the copy of the phonorecord that was loaded into 
RAM will be destroyed when the device is turned off. Courts have recently been forced to determine if 
loading a digital file into RAM creates a "copy" under the 1976 Act that is sufficiently fixed for infringement 
purposes.  
¶ 16           Some addressing this topic claim that RAM copies are not sufficiently fixed for infringement 
purposes, but the prevailing view is that RAM copies are sufficiently fixed. The sticking point for this 
debate is the phrase "for more than a transitory duration" in the definition of fixation.19 Those who argue 
that the copies are merely ephemeral and not fixed point to the legislative history of the 1976 Act. The 
House Report accompanying the Act states that: 
"[T]he definition of ‘fixation’ would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or 
transient reproductions such as those * * * captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a 
computer."20 
¶ 17           The prevailing view looks to the 1993 MAI Systems v. Peak Computer case21 for support. In 
MAI, the Ninth Circuit held that loading a computer operating system into RAM from permanent storage 
created a fixed copy of the operating system, sufficient for infringement purposes. The MAI reasoning 
was adopted in several other courts22 and in the political realm by the so-called “White Paper.” 23 
Additionally, Congress implicitly supported the legal findings of MAI when it altered Section 117 to 
specifically overrule the facts of MAI, while not overruling the legal propositions of the case.24 In fact, 
Congress specifically rejected a proposal to state that no RAM copying is infringement (and thus directly 
overturn MAI) in 1998.25 
¶ 18           The reasoning of MAI can be extended beyond computer programs because all digital files are 
loaded into RAM to be manipulated - just as programs are. If loading into RAM creates fixed copies for 
these computer programs it follows that other digital files loaded into RAM are also sufficiently fixed. 
Regardless of which side of the debate is correct policy, RAM copies are deemed fixed for purposes of 
finding infringement under Copyright law. 
The Legal Significance of Digital Phonorecords 
¶ 19           The technology used for digital phonorecords creates a large legal rift between digital 
phonorecords and other phonorecords. While non-digital phonorecords do not implicate the reproduction 
right during use, digital phonorecords do. For example, when I listen to a vinyl record, I simply put the 
turntable needle on the groove and it plays. However, when I want to listen to my Mp3 version of the 
song, a RAM copy is made and thus the author’s exclusive reproduction right is implicated. Under MAI, 
this copy is sufficient for infringement purposes if I was the unlawful possessor of this Mp3.26  
¶ 20           Digital phonorecords also differ from other phonorecords because there exists unlimited and 
unchecked reproduction ability in the digital realm. This ability is distinct from the reproductions made 
during the utilization of the digital phonorecord (RAM copy made for listening) and is arguably the more 
problematic issue for Copyright owners. While it is possible to make reproductions of more traditional 
phonorecord formats, the process is expensive and labor-intensive. The most difficult common-format 
phonorecord to reproduce is likely the vinyl record, because reproduction requires a machine that 
measures and records the physical grooves of the master record and then cuts individual vinyl copies 
after this. Analog tape is easier, but the more generational copies you make, the lower the sound quality 
becomes. CD’s are much easier because massive machines exist to "burn" hundreds of copies 
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simultaneously, but the media used can be expensive. In contrast, I can make hundreds of digital copies 
of any digital phonorecord in seconds by simply utilizing my computer’s copy and paste functions. Each 
and every one of these copies will be a costless, sonically exact copy of the original. For Copyright 
owners, there is no way of knowing how many digital reproductions are made or which files are in fact 
reproductions and which are originals.  
¶ 21           A final distinction between digital phonorecords and traditional phonorecord formats is the ease 
of instant and widespread distribution of copies. While it may be easy to hand off a copy of a pirated CD 
to a friend, it is even easier to distribute hundreds of infringing copies of a digital phonorecord via email. 
Additionally, the Internet allows for instant unlimited distribution to people all over the world, almost a 
mind-boggling concept. 
The First Sale Doctrine Does Not Fit Digital Phonorecords 
¶ 22           As currently written and interpreted, the First Sale doctrine does not allow the disposal of digital 
phonorecords through distribution. First Sale does not allow distribution because there is no transfer of 
ownership when there is a transfer of possession. Even if there is a transfer of ownership, though, First 
Sale does not allow for the distribution of the phonorecord because of the reproductions necessary for 
this distribution and the ease of distribution of infringing copies.  
¶ 23           In the absence of a clear indication of transfer, it is unclear if there is a transfer of ownership 
under Section 109(d) when you receive a digital phonorecord.27 I argue this change in possession does 
not transfer ownership in the digital phonorecord. Instead, there is something similar to an implied license 
in which you can use and delete the phonorecord, but not further distribute it in any manner. Allowing a 
user to distribute a digital phonorecord implicates the Copyright owner’s exclusive reproduction right is 
and counter to the policy underlying United States Copyright law.  
¶ 24           The First Sale doctrine is a statutory doctrine that allows you to do two things: destroy or 
distribute. For digital phonorecords, reproduction is required for use, but you surely have an implied 
license to make these reproductions when listening to a lawfully obtained copy.28 You also likely have an 
implied license to dispose of a lawfully obtained digital phonorecord by deleting the file.29  
¶ 25           Although an implied license to make RAM copies likely exists, an implied license to reproduce a 
digital phonorecord while distributing it likely does not. This is because of the ease in which infringing 
reproductions and distributions of these reproductions occur in the digital realm. Reproductions in RAM 
and email buffers for alienation are not as bad as the ability to make hundreds of perfect digital copies 
and send them to numerous friends. If the digital phonorecord was sold to you on a magnetic media, such 
as a floppy disk, a reproduction must be made to move the file to your computer - both for use and 
storage. Thus, even if the digital phonorecord were on a disk, infringing reproductions are easily made 
and distributed.  
¶ 26           The necessary reproductions made to distribute the digital phonorecords, and the ease of 
creating and distributing infringing phonorecords, are contrary to the public policy underlying Copyright 
law. While Copyright law does not usually employ the balancing tests ubiquitous in other areas of the law, 
this requires a balance. Copyright balances the incentive given to authors with those rights given to the 
public. The incentive is a limited monopoly that the author may exploit, balanced against certain 
limitations on what may be protected under Copyright and for how long. For example, the protection of life 
plus seventy years is undercut by the fact that only the original expression, and not the facts or ideas 
therein, may be protected for this length. And while the author has the exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works from her original work, she must also share with the public the ability to parody her work.  
¶ 27           This balancing test is important to digital phonorecords because the interests of the composers 
and producers of these phonorecords have to be balanced against the interests of those that purchase 
and use these phonorecords. While it is true that a person should be able to sell her legally obtained copy 
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of a phonorecord, the composers and producers of the song must be able to recoup their investment in 
their work.30 In the digital realm, reproduction and distribution of the reproduced copies is so easy that it 
seems almost counterintuitive to pay for a legally obtained copy if your friend can email a copy to you for 
free. This process can easy snowball to the point that a single phonorecord sold is reproduced into 
hundreds of perfect digital phonorecords. Although hundreds of people enjoy the phonorecord, the 
composers and producers are paid for just one phonorecord. In order to ensure incentive to create new 
works, composers must be able to limit this. Thus when the artist sells the digital phonorecords to the 
customer, regarding that sale as a transfer of possession of a digital phonorecord, rather than a transfer 
of title, is more conducive to underlying Copyright policy. 31   
¶ 28           Even if the receipt of a digital phonorecord transfers ownership, First Sale does not allow a 
person to dispose of a digital phonorecord through distribution. First Sale is of no help because the 
reproduction right is always implicated in the digital realm.  
¶ 29           For example, First Sale would not shield the transmission of a digital phonorecord over the 
Internet. In both the digital realm and the physical world it is easy to alienate a phonorecord. In the non-
digital world, I put my copy into an envelope and mail it to a friend. In the digital realm, the process is 
even easier - I simply attach an Mp3 to an email and send this to a friend. In the non-digital world, my 
friend has my copy of the record (and the same number of copies exist), but in the digital realm there are 
more copies than we started with.32 This is because an email program reproduces the original file you 
wish to attach and sends the reproduction, not the file resident on your hard drive. This is what allows you 
to address a single email to hundreds of people, attach a file, and all the people receive the email and the 
file while you still retain your copy of the file. But First Sale only allows you to dispose of a particular 
phonorecord, not reproduce a phonorecord. So even if you distributed the phonorecord to one person 
over the Internet, First Sale will not shield this transfer.  
¶ 30           Another reason First Sale will not allow the distribution of a digital phonorecord is because any 
digital phonorecord distributed will be a reproduction, [and] not the "particular copy" owned. Section 109 
allows the owner of a digital phonorecord to dispose of her "particular copy," not any reproductions 
thereof. The digital realm is one defined by an ease of copying and also necessary copying - 
reproductions are made when a digital file is used as well as when it is transmitted. A reproduction is 
made when a person wishes to transmit the phonorecord, and it is the reproduction that is transmitted, 
not the "particular copy" the person owns. Additionally, a reproduction of the phonorecord is made when a 
person transfers the phonorecord from one medium to another, i.e. from a hard drive to a diskette. If the 
person sells the diskette to a friend, the phonorecord contained therein is the reproduction, not the 
"particular copy" the person owns. Because First Sale cannot shield any reproductions, it is inapplicable 
in this situation.  
¶ 31           A final reason why First Sale does not allow distribution of digital phonorecords rests in the 
public policy supporting the Copyright monopoly. As stated above, Copyright balances the incentives 
given to authors with those rights given to the public. Thus, the author is given a limited monopoly as an 
incentive to create, but certain limitations are placed on what may be protected and for how long. In order 
for the author to continue creating, her monopoly must be protected - i.e., protection from infringing 
reproduction and distribution of her work. Because of the ease of infringing reproductions and 
distributions in the digital realm, this balance falls in favor of the Copyright owner.  
¶ 32           It may be said that the answer is to allow these reproductions but raise the price of digital 
phonorecords. This idea would only serve to motivate people to find an infringing copy instead of pay an 
increasing amount for the legitimate phonorecord. Similarly, the answer cannot be to reduce the cost. The 
cost of a single digital phonorecords is very small33 but even a nominal fee costs more than the free 
alternative. Moreover, the lower the cost, the lower the royalties paid to the composer and producer. This 
just serves to decrease the incentive to create further works. For digital phonorecords, the answer must 
be to restrict the ability of individuals to make reproductions and distribute these reproductions.  
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Conclusion 
¶ 33           This iBrief has followed various phonorecord formats to illustrate the specifics of the First Sale 
doctrine as it applies to digital phonorecords. While First Sale clearly allows an owner of a non-digital 
phonorecord format of this song, such as vinyl record and CD, to dispose of her copy through further 
distribution, First Sale is inapplicable to similar distributions of digital phonorecords because of the 
reproductions made during distribution and the ease in which infringing reproductions can be further 
distributed. 
By: Bob Hyde 
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1. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1999).  
2. The full text of Section 106 is as follows:  
"Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of a Copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the 
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to reproduce the Copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;  
to prepare derivative works based upon the Copyrighted work;  
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4. 17 U.S.C. §109(d) (1994).  
5. 17 U.S.C. §109(b)(1)(A) (1994). The Record Rental Amendment (Pub.L. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984)) added this particular language to 
Section 109 in an attempt to combat widespread illicit copying of phonorecords caused by record rental houses. For further discussion see 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-927, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2898, 2899. 
6. It is important to note Section 202 of the 1976 Act. This Section provides in relevant part that:  
"Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the 
work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object * * * does not itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the 
object[.]"  
17 U.S.C. §202 (1976). Thus, when I buy a phonorecord, the Copyright owner does not lose his rights in the underlying work. The converse 
of this is that the owner of the Copyright may still exercise his/her exclusive rights provided under section 106, regardless of who owns the 
material support. The limit to this is the right of distribution in First Sale. However, all other rights in the work, such as reproduction are 
retained by the Copyright owner and thus cannot be exercised by the owner of the physical support. 
2001 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0018 
7 
7. This may seem like an example of common sense, but the "particular copy" will be important to the discussion of digital phonorecords 
below. 
8. See Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 940 F.Supp. 86, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
9. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.Supp. 741, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1983).  
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14. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1999).  
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16. I will focus on computers because they are by far the most widely used medium for digital phonorecords.  
17. See Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assoc., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See also Nimmer §8.08. See generally CONTU Final 
Report. Section 117 specifically allows the installation (i.e. making a reproduction of the work from the disk and placing the reproduction of 
the work onto the user’s hard drive) of computer software into a computer for purposes of use. However, section 117 does not speak to other 
digital wo rks, such as digital phonorecords.  
18. The computer must load the phonorecord into RAM in order to manipulate, i.e. play, stop, or pause, the file. 
19. See eg. Jessica Litman, Copyright in the Twenty-First Century: The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 29, 41-44 
(1994).  
20. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666. 
21. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert denied 510 U.S. 1033; 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).  
22. See eg. Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. App. 1998); Marobie-Fl., Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 
983 F. Supp. 1167, (N.D. Ill. 1997); CSU Holdings v. Xerox (In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.), 910 F. Supp. 1537, (D. Kan. 
1995); Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).  
23. Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights. Bruce 
A. Lehman and Ronald H. Brown. Information Infrastructure Task Force, pages 64-66 (1995).  
24. Section 117(c) allows an exception for reproductions made for "machine maintenance or repair." 17 U.S.C. §117(c) (1998).  
25. Report to Congress: Study Examining 17 U.S.C. Sections 109 and 117 Pursuant to Section 104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, page 9 (March 2001).  
26. It is true that new technological advances that prevent ski pping in CD players may create RAM buffer copies inside the CD player. While 
this buffering has not been examined by courts to determine if a legal parallel exists with computer RAM copies, it seems unlikely that the CD 
player copies would be infringing. First, the CD player RAM buffers only a few seconds of the song. Second, and more importantly, a CD 
player requiring buffering techniques would not likely be able to reproduce the digitally buffered sounds. Unlike a computer that is able to 
make duplications of RAM copies, a CD player’s RAM buffer has no other value outside of the utilization and function of listening to the 
phonorecord. 
27. Most sites offering lawfully obtainable digital phonorecords do not discuss the Copyright in the phonorecord or the transfer of ownership 
of the phonorecord. The exception is EMusic (http://www.emusic.com), which discusses Copyright in terms of "Personal Rights & 
Responsibilities as an MP3 User." This section of the website is more a discussion of personal/fair use of digital phonorecords and does not 
specifically address ownership. 
28. Under MAI, it seems clear that the reproductions made from a pirated copy could be a violation of the exclusive reproduction right and an 
infringement. However, there is no exclusive right to use in the Copyright Act, unlike the protection given to patent. Ralph Brown, Jr., 
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discussed this topic in his article, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 579, 588-89 (1985). 
Professor Brown notes that the Copyright Act does not confer any exclusive right to use a work, which helps explain why the standards for 
obtaining a patent monopoly are so much more stringent. 
29. The reproduction right is not implicated in deletion of the phonorecord. Thus, First Sale allows you to dispose of your particular copy 
through deletion. 
30. If authors are unable to recoup investment, there will be no incentive to create new works.  
31. The argument that the transfer of possession of a digital phonorecord does not transfer title is slightly undercut by previous holdings 
concerning motion picture prints. Until the advent of home video devices, it was standard practice in the movie industry for movie companies 
to rent motion picture prints to movie theaters rather than actually transferring title. See Nimmer §8.12, section B.1. Courts began, however, 
to qualify a transfer in possession without a time limit and without an express reservation of title as a sale. See United States v. Atherton, 561 
F.2d 747 (9 Cir. 1977); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9 Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977), reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 977 
(1977). These movie print cases can be easily distinguished from digital phonorecords, though, because of the medium involved. Unlike film 
prints, digital phonorecords are easily reproducible and these copies are easily distributed after reproduction. Motion picture prints are simply 
not as easily reproduced and distributed as digital files.  
32. At very least, there are two copies of the phonorecord at this point - the phonorecord I retained and the phonorecord that my friend 
receives. Depending on the email system used, though, there may be many more phonorecord copies made. 
33. As of April 21, 2001, EMusic sells digital phonorecords for $.99 per song. 
 
